What happens when you use a partially defective bit-commitment protocol to commit to the same bit many times? For example, suppose that the protocol allows the receiver to guess the committed bit with advantage ε, and that you used that protocol to commit to the same bit more than 1/ε times. Or suppose that you encrypted some message many times (to many people), only to discover later that the encryption scheme that you were using is partially defective, and an eavesdropper has some noticeable advantage in guessing the encrypted message from the ciphertext. Can we at least show that even after many such encryptions, the eavesdropper could not have learned the message with certainty?
Introduction
This work discusses the effect of running several executions of a cryptographic protocol sequentially, on the secrecy or correctness guarantees of that protocol. An illustrating example to keep in mind is a defective bit-commitment scheme, where the sender may open the commitment in two ways with probability up to δ (binding defect) and the receiver may have probability of up to (1 + ε)/2 in guessing the sender's bit (secrecy defect). We ask how does sequential repetition of such a protocol effect ε and δ, in situations where the inputs to the various executions may be dependent.
This question is closely related to the issue of robust combiners for cryptographic protocols. Indeed, Damgård et al. considered in [2] just this kind of defective protocols (for both commitment and oblivious transfer), and described how a non-defective protocol can be obtained from them. Two transformations were described in [2] , one running many copies of the defective protocol with the same input bit, and the other running many copies with randomly chosen inputs whose exclusive-or equals the original input bit. Damgård et al. proved that in an information-theoretic setting, if the original defects satisfy ε + δ < 1 then alternating between these two transformations can reduce the secrecy and binding defects to negligible quantities. Given these results, one would like to prove the same result also in the computational setting.
To illustrate the problem with moving to the computational setting, consider using a defective bitcommitment scheme to commit twice to the same input bit. In the information theoretic setting from [2] , it is clear that if the commitment scheme has secrecy defect of ε, then using it twice with the same input bit yields a secrecy defect of 1 − (1 − ε) 2 = 2ε − ε 2 . In the computational setting, however, the simple hybrid argument that is commonly used to reason about "encrypting the same message many times" can only prove a bound of 2ε on the resulting defect, which is clearly too weak of a bound. (For example, one needs to show that the resulting scheme offers some secrecy, even if the original one has secrecy defect of 2 3 .) In the specific context of robust combiners for commitment and oblivious-transfer, results similar to those of Damgård et al. were recently proved in the computational setting by Wullschleger [9] . Wullschleger was able to bypass the problem from above to some extent by working in the "honestbut-curious" model and considering a "randomized" variant of these primitives, where the parties execute the protocol on random bits, which are considered outputs of the protocol rather than inputs to it. These variants are known to be equivalent to the standard notions of commitment and oblivious transfer, but since the parties have no inputs then the different executions are truly independent. Using results of Holenstein on hardness amplification of independent executions [5, 6] , Wullschleger proved that starting from a defective protocol for the randomized variants, one can obtain a non-defective protocol for the same variant.
It should be noted that the techniques of Holenstein, which are based on the hard-core-set approach of Impagliazzo [7] , were originated in the non-interactive setting of one-way functions and do not extend in general to hardness of interactive protocols (see discussion in the appendix). However, they do extend to interactive protocols in the honest-but-curious attack model, so Wullschleger used these techniques to get a secure OT protocol in the honest-but-curious model, and then applied the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson "compiler" [3] to get a secure protocol against malicious adversaries.
Our Results
Although sufficient for proving the existence of OT-combiners, Wullschleger's results still leave several open problems: Mainly, they do not answer the fundamental question regarding the effect of sequential repetition on the secrecy and correctness guarantees of protocols (in the face of malicious adversaries). They also do not answer the question of whether the specific transformations that were described by Damgård et al. [2] work also in the computational setting. Finally, since it relies on the GMW "compiler" then Wullschleger's combiner does not preserve in any way the efficiency properties of the original defective scheme. Closing these gaps is the focus of the current work.
Hardness Amplification/Degradation Lemmas. In Section 3 we describe a rather generic setting where one can argue about hardness amplification and degradation of interactive protocols. We formulate and prove two new lemmas, showing that the information theoretic bounds on hardness-degradation (for both secrecy and correctness) carry over also to the computational setting: Lemma 3.2 asserts that the secrecy degradation from "encrypting the same message t times" obeys the bound of 1 − (1 − ε) t . Similarly, Lemma 3.5 asserts that given t interactive puzzles that are δ-hard to solve, the probability of solving at least one of them is at most 1 − (1 − δ) t . These lemmas can be thought of as mirroring Yao's XOR lemma and Yao's hardness-amplification lemma for one-way functions [10] , respectively. The proofs of these hardness-degradation lemmas are similar in their high-level structure to the corresponding hardness-amplification proofs. For Lemma 3.2 we had to prove a new lemma (Lemma 3.3) that plays a role similar to the one played by Levin's "Isolation Lemma" in the proof of Yao's XOR lemma.
We complement the results for secrecy/correctness degradation with results on secrecy/correctness amplification. Specifically, we observe that some (but not all) of the known proofs for Yao's XOR lemma and Yao's hardness-amplification lemma can be used to prove amplification also for interactive protocols. 1 Improving Defective protocols. We then consider the applicability of our hardness amplification and degradation lemmas to the analysis of the transformations from [2] . Roughly, we prove that these transformations result in a secure protocol whenever the defect parameters of the original protocol satisfy ε + δ ≤ 1 − 1/polylog(k) (with k the security parameter), but our lemmas cannot be applied to prove security in some cases where ε + δ is bounded away from 1 only by a polynomial fraction. In Lemma 4.1, we characterize exactly the range of the defect parameters (ε, δ) for which we can prove that these transformations produce a secure protocol.
Notations
The statistical distance between two distributions D 1 , D 2 over a countable domain is the scaled sum
where the sum is taken over all the elements in the union of the support of the two distributions, and D i (x) is the probability mass of x according to the distribution D i . We use x ∈ R S to denote choosing x from S uniformly at random. A positive function is negligible if it tends to zero faster than any polynomial, and it is noticeable otherwise.
An algorithm is called efficient if it runs in probabilistic polynomial time. A two-party protocol is a pair of algorithms, one for each party. We use the following notations to describe a two-party protocol (A, B):
• The event where A outputs the string x is denoted (A(a, r a ) In these notations, a, b are the inputs and r a , r b are the randomness used by the participants. We often omit the randomness (and sometimes also the input) from these notations. We use to denote a "don't care" input or output.
Amplification/Degradation of Computational Hardness
In this section we prove some lemmas about amplification and degradation of computational hardness for sequential composition of protocols. (By "computational hardness" we roughly mean breaking either the secrecy or correctness of the protocol.) The amplification lemmas are straightforward extensions of Yao's XOR lemma and Yao's hardness-amplification lemma for one-way functions [10, 4] , but the degradation lemmas are new.
We deal with two-party protocols, where one player either tries to guess the input of the other party or tries to break the correctness of the protocol (e.g., in a commitment scheme the goal is either to learn the committed bit or to open the commitment in two different ways). We study how the computational-hardness of accomplishing these tasks is amplified or degraded when several copies of the protocol are run sequentially in various settings. We consider the following four scenarios in the setting of two parties A and B, where A has input a.
again, the proof of Canetti et al. [1] can be easily extended to interactive protocols. 2 Degradation We consider the setting where after t runs of the protocol, player A needs to break any one of the t executions. This "hardness degradation" setting is dealt with in Lemma 3.5.
(The proof closely mirrors the "hardness amplification" proof from [1] .)
Secrecy Amplification and Degradation
Let (A, B) be an interactive protocol where A has a single-bit input a ∈ {0, 1} (and B may have no input), and let t = t(k) be polynomially bounded. Denote by (A t = , B t ) a t-fold sequential repetition of (A, B) , where the protocol (A, B) is run t times sequentially, each time with the same input bit a. Also denote by (A t ⊕ , B t ) a t-fold sequential repetition of (A, B), where the input of A in each run is random and independent, subject to the condition that the XOR of the inputs in all the runs equals to the input bit of A t ⊕ . Lemma 4] .) The reason that this particular proof extends to the interactive case (whereas the other proofs from [4] do not seem to extend) is that this proof does not need to "rewind" A:
Recall that we assume an adversary B with advantage better than ε t when talking to A t ⊕ , and we want to construct an adversary B * with advantage better than ε when talking to A. In the non-interactive case, we had a "puzzle" that came from A and we could stick that puzzle anywhere in a vector of t puzzles and let B attempt to solve that vector. We could also stick the same puzzle in many vectors and run B on all oof them. In the interactive case, on the other hand, once we sent some messages to the real party A, we cannot "take them back" and try another interaction instead.
On a high level, the reduction following Levin's approach proceeds as follows: B * simulates the interactions between B and A t ⊕ for several runs, i = 1, 2, . . .: Starting from the state that B ended at after the i − 1'st run, B * uses repeated sampling to look for a simulated execution of the i'th run after which B * still has advantage better than ε t−i in guessing the bit of A t−i ⊕ (where the probability is taken over the remaining runs). It continues in this fashion until it cannot find such an i'th run (or until it gets to the last run). Then it uses the current state of B as a basis for a single interaction with the "real player" A. If this was the last run then it uses the output of B as the guess of A's input bit, and otherwise it uses repeated sampling again to estimate the probability that B outputs one (taken over the remaining runs), and compares that probability to some threshold (that it can also compute using repeated sampling). Levin's isolation lemma then proves that if at some point B failed to find an i'th run as above, then there is a threshold that it can set that would give it an advantage better than ε of guessing the input bit of the "real player" A. 2
Lemma 3.2 (Secrecy Degradation) If (A, B) has an ε-bounded secrecy defect with respect to A and t is polynomially-bounded, then (A t = , B t ) has an ε -bounded secrecy defect with respect to
We emphasize that the simple hybrid argument that is commonly used to reason about "encrypting the same message many times" can be used in this context to prove a bound of ε ≤ tε. The difficulty in the proof below is in improving the bound from tε to 1
Proof: Let t = t(k) be polynomially bounded, let ε = ε(k), and denote ε
We show that if there exist a randomized adversary B of time complexity T such that
where ρ = ρ(k) is noticeable, then there exists a randomized adversary B * of time complexity
2 .
An alternative way to write the condition P r[(A
Below we always use this alternative formulation.
Consider breaking B into two parts: the first part B 1 interacts with A(a) only once and outputs the internal state at the end of this interaction, and the second part B 2 gets this internal state as input and then interacts with A(a) for t − 1 more times before outputting a guess for the bit a. Denote by D 0 , D 1 the probability distribution of the internal state s after B 1 interacts with A(0), A(1), respectively.
→ s , and
is interpreted both as a probability distribution and as the corresponding support set). For any given internal state s ∈ D 0 ∪ D 1 , consider the experiment where starting from this internal state s, B 2 interacts t − 1 more times with A, but the input of A in all these executions is some bit a (which may or may not be equal to the input bit a of the first execution). We denote by p 0 (s), p 1 (s) the probabilities that B outputs 1 in this experiment when a = 0 and a = 1, respectively. Namely, for every s ∈ D 0 ∪ D 1 we denote 
, or there exists some probability threshold τ such that The actual statement of the technical lemma below is slightly more complicated, since it also includes the "slackness parameter" ρ that is needed to get the result in a uniform complexity setting. Specifically, in the first case there should be a significant probability of finding a state s * for which 
, where the expectation is over choosing τ uni-
We prove Lemma 3.3 later in this section. Using this lemma, we now complete the proof of Lemma 3.2 as follows: from the assertion we have that Figure 1 : An illustration of Lemma 3.3. We know that the gray area in the lower-right box is more than X + (1 − (1 − ε) t ). We essentially prove that either there is s * such that
Proof of Lemma 3.3. The proof relies on the identity
that holds for any non-negative random variable X. In our case, we have p 0 , p 1 ∈ [0, 1] so we can integrate between 0 and 1 (rather than 0 and ∞). Assume that the premise of the lemma holds but condition (i) does not, and we prove that then condition (ii) must hold. For the proof below, denote
If condition (i) does not hold then with all but probability ερ/2 over choosing s ∈ R D 0 , we have
and therefore also
Using this inequality and the premise of the lemma, we can write:
Hence, the expected value of the difference Pr
Hardness Amplification and Degradation
Consider an interactive protocol P = (A, B), and let R P be a poly-time recognizable relation that describes what it means for A to "break the protocol's correctness". Namely, after the protocol is run and B's output is some string y, a cheating A is successful if it outputs a string x such that (x, y) ∈ R P . (For example, (A, B) is a commitment scheme, A is the sender, B's output is the communication transcript y, and (x, y) ∈ R P if x contains two different openings that are both consistent with y.)
Let (A t , B t ) be a t-fold sequential repetition of the protocol (A, B) with A, B having the same input (if any) but independent randomness. Define ∧ t (R P ) and ∨ t (R P ) as the AND and OR of the t individual relations, namely
In other words, ∧ t (R P ) represents the case that all the t copies must be broken, and ∨ t (R P ) represents the case that at least one copy is broken. The proof is nearly identical to the hardness-amplification proof from [1] for the non-interactive case (and also very similar to the proof for Lemma 3.5 below). Again, the reason that this proof extends to the interactive case (whereas some other proofs of Yao's lemma of weak-to-strong-OWFs do not extend) is that it does not need to "rewind" the player B. 2 Lemma 3.5 (Hardness Degradation) If P = (A, B) has a δ-bounded R P -defect with respect to B and t is polynomially bounded then (A t , B t ) has a δ -bounded ∨ t (R P )-defect with respect to B t , where
Proof (sketch): The proof is very similar to the hardness-amplification proof from [1] . Let t = t(k) be polynomially bounded, and let δ = δ(k) be a noticeable function and
Assume that there exists a randomized adversary A of time complexity T that satisfies the relation ∨ t (R P ) with probability δ + ρ for some noticeable quantity ρ = ρ (k). We then show that there exists a randomized adversary A * of time complexity T * = T · poly(kt/δ ρ ) that satisfies R P with probability δ + ρ, where ρ is the solution to (
Observe that if ρ is noticeable and t is polynomial then also ρ is noticeable. Note also that by definition, the success probability of A is 1
Denote the state of A after the i'th interaction with B by s i (with s 0 being the initial state of A ). The adversary A * begins by playing the role of B in the first interaction. Repeating the first interaction up to poly(kt/δρ) times, A * is looking for an internal state s 1 after the first interaction such that when proceeding from this state, A satisfies R P for one of the last t − 1 runs with probability at least 1 − (1 − δ − ρ) t−1 . (Note that A can estimate that probability by sampling.)
If A * succeeds in finding such s 1 , then it fixes that internal state and keeps looking for internal states s 2 , s 3 , . . . such that when proceeding from s i , adversary A satisfies R P for one of the last t − i runs with probability at least 1 − (1 − δ − ρ) t−i . If A * can find an internal state s t−1 from which A satisfies R P for the last run with probability ≥ δ + ρ then we are done: A * just uses A from this state when interacting with the real B. Otherwise, A * has some state s i with 0 ≤ i < t − 1 such that A satisfies R P for one of the last t − i runs with probability at least 1 − (1 − δ − ρ) t−i , and yet for (almost) all continuation states s i+1 , A only satisfies R P for one of the last t − i − 1 runs with probability less than 1
We now consider a "matrix" M that represent the interaction of A with B on the remaining t − i runs of the protocol, when A starts from this state s i . (We assume that s i includes all the randomness that A needs for all the runs.) The columns of M are labeled by all the possibilities for the randomness of B during the i + 1'st run, and rows are labeled by all the possibilities for the randomness of B in runs i + 2, . . . , t. Hence, each entry in the matrix corresponds to a particular interaction of A with B on the remaining t − i runs of the protocol.
Each entry in M is labeled with two bits, where the first bit is 1 if at the end of that interaction A satisfies R P for the i + 1'st run, and the second bit is 1 if A satisfies R P for one of the last t − i − 1 runs. By our assumption on the state s i , we know that a random entry in this matrix is labeled with (0, 0) with probability at most γ
Then, it must be the case that either M has (sufficiently many) columns where the fraction of entries of the form ( , 0) is no more than α, or else the conditional probability of a (0,0) entry given that the entry is of the form ( , 0) is at most (only slightly more than) β.
The failure of A * to find a continuation state s i+1 with sufficient residual success probability indicates that the first case does not hold, so the second case must hold. Hence, in this case A * uses A starting from s i to interact with the real player B, arriving at some state s i+1 after this "real interaction." Then, A * simulates many more runs of A with B starting from this s i+1 . Adversary A * looks for a run in which A does not satisfy R P for any of the last t − i − 1 runs, and uses the output of A in that run in the hope that it satisfies R P for the i + 1'st run. The conditional probability argument from above says that the odds of satisfying R P for the i+1'st run conditioned on not satisfying it for the last t − i − 1 runs is (only slightly less than) 1 − β = δ + ρ. Indeed, a detailed argument that mirrors the proof of [1, Lemma 1] shows that this algorithm A * has success probability noticeably larger than δ. 2 "Weakly verifiable" relations. Since the proof of Lemma 3.5 is fashioned after the proof from [1] , it can be used also in settings where the relation R P is only "weakly verifiable". Namely, when only B can verify the relation R P (because it depends on some private output of B). This makes the above lemma applicable also to the setting of commitment with non-perfect functionality, where even an honest opening may be rejected with some probability (depending on the internal randomness of the receiver).
Fixing Defective Protocols
In [2] , Damgård et al. considered defective two-party protocols such as oblivious-transfer and commitment between a Sender and a Receiver. They suggested reducing the defect by alternating between two transformations: Roughly, in a "type-R" transformation the parties run t copies of the protocol with the same input bits for the sender, and in a "type-S" transformation the sender chooses t random bits whose exclusive-or equals to its input bit and then the parties run one copy of the protocol for each of these random bits.
Below we assume that the underlying protocol has defect ε for the Sender security and defect δ for the Receiver security (such as the commitment protocol that was described in the introduction).
In the information-theoretic setting that was considered in [2] , it is clear that applying a type-R transformation results in a protocol with sender defect 1 − (1 − ε) t and receiver defect δ t , and similarly applying a type-S transformation results in a protocol with sender defect ε t and receiver defect 1 − (1 − δ) t . It was shown in [2] that as long as ε + δ < 1 − 1/poly(k), one can alternate between these transformations several times (with total number of copies polynomial in k) and reduce both defects to negligible quantities in k.
Our lemmas from Section 3 imply that the same bounds on the effect of type-R and type-S transformations hold also in the computational setting. One could hope, therefore, that the alternation strategy from [2] can be proven to work also in this setting. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The reason is the strategy from [2] uses a non-constant number of alternations. The proofs for hardnessamplification and degradation from Section 3 all incur a polynomial blowup in the complexity of the adversary for every alternation, and hence a non-constant number of alternations would cause a super-polynomial blowup in the adversary complexity. In Section 4.1 below we analyze the range of parameters ε, δ for which we can reduce the defect to a negligible amount using only a constant number of alternations.
Relation to Wullschleger's work. As we explained in the introduction, Wullschleger recently was able to extend the results from [2] to the computational setting in the "honest-bu-curious" model, using a technique based on the hard-core-set lemma of Holenstein [5, 6 ]. Wullschleger's work yield stronger defect-reduction results than the ones that we can obtain from a direct analysis of the transformations of [2] : he is able to fix a defect of ε + δ < 1 − 1/poly(k), where we can roughly fix only when ε + δ < 1 − 1/polylog(k). However, Wullschleger's technique only applied in the honest-but-curious attack model work, whereas ours applies also in the standard model of a malicious adversary. Also, Wullschleger's results do not shed light on what happens when a defective protocol is run several times on related inputs, and does not say what happens when the original transformations from [2] are used in the computational setting.
Iterating the Transformations
Below, we prove that repeating the transformations S and R a constant number of times results in a scheme with negligible defects as long as ε + δ is bounded away from 1 and, moreover, ε
We begin by setting a few conventions and notations. First, we can assume without loss of generality that we always alternate between transformations S and R (since applying two successive transformations of the same type with parameters t and t is the same as just one transformation with parameter tt ). We also assume, without loss of generality, that for ε > δ we begin with transformation S and for ε ≤ δ we begin with transformation R. (Namely, we choose the first transformation to increase the larger value and decrease the smaller one.) This is without loss of generality, since we can always start with a "dummy transformation" with parameter t = 1.
With these two assumptions, a chain of transformations is completely characterized by the initial values ε 0 , δ 0 and by the sequence of parameters t 1 , t 2 , . . . that indicate how many times we repeat the scheme from step i in step i + 1. In the analysis below we refer to this representation as a "chain".
Definition 3 (Transformation chains) A transformation chain (or just chain) is represented by a vector
we can compute the values ε i , δ i for each i = 1, . . . , as follows:
, and for odd i we set
• If ε 0 < δ 0 then we swap the even and odd rules.
It is clear, however, that not every "chain" corresponds to a sequence of transformations that we can use. For example, it is clear that i t i must be polynomial in the security parameter k. Moreover, all the ε i 's and δ i 's must be bounded away from 1 (i.e., be at most 1 − 1/poly(k)), since our defect definitions imply that a defect of 1 − negl(k) is the same as a defect of 1. These conditions are captured in the following definition:
Moreover, the reductions proving lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 increase the size of the adversary by a polynomial factor (even if we only use t = 2), so we can only apply these transformations a constant number of times. This means that, to get a scheme with negligible defect, we must find a constantlength confined chain that begins with the given (ε 0 , δ 0 ) and ends with ε , δ = negl(k). The next lemma asserts a necessary and sufficient conditions on (ε 0 , δ 0 ) for such a chain to exist.
There exist a constant-length confined chain that begins with these (ε 0 , δ 0 ) and ends with ε , δ = negl(k) if and
Proof: Roughly, the proof considers the quantity a = 
If (⇒) Assume that, for some constant c ≥ 1, it holds that max(ε 0 , δ 0 ) ≤ 1 − k −c , and also
We show a confined chain of length at most c + 5 such that ε c+5 , δ c+5 = negl(k). Assume that max(ε 0 , δ 0 ) > k −c for some c (otherwise we already have ε 0 , δ 0 = negl(k)), and consider the following procedure for generating such a chain:
6.
7.
i := i + 1
Output the chain (ε 0 , δ 0 ), (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t i+2 )
We start by establishing some simple invariants that holds throughout all the iterations of the loop.
• For all i we have L i +H i < 1. This follows since initially we have L 0 +H 0 < 1, and if x+y < 1 then also (1 − (1 − x) t ) + y t < 1 for all t ≥ 1 so this property is preserved.
• For all i we have
follows since the t i 's are chosen specifically to ensure it.
-On the other hand, we always set H i := 1−(1−α) t i for some α < 1 and where t i is chosen as max{t :
• Since
• Inside the loop, we always have
We now observe that all the t i 's are polynomially bounded:
shows that in Line 5 we have t i+1 = O(k c+1 log k). Next, we consider the quantity a i
(which we can re-write as
We now show that in each iteration of the loop, the quantity a i − 1 increases by at least a factor of Ω(log k).
, and note that
Observe that for each iteration of the loop, we have
and therefore
We have seen that a 1 − 1 > Ω( 1 log c (k) ) and that a i+1 − 1 ≥ Ω(log k) · (a i − 1), so after at most c + 1 iterations of the loop we get a i − 1 ≥ Ω(log k) > 4.
If we still do not have a i > 2k then we will do another iteration of the loop. In this iteration, we have (as usual)
. Therefore, at the end of this iteration we have
On the other hand, we have (as usual)
We conclude that the loop terminates after at most c + 2 iterations, so the chain is indeed of constant length. It is left to show that the chain remains confined in the last two steps, and that L i+2 , H i+2 are both negligible. Once the loop terminates, we have
On the other hand,
Finally, after the last step we have
This concludes the proof of the if direction. 2
Only if (⇐). Assume that
polylog(k) , and assume that ε 0 ≥ δ 0 (the other case is symmetric). Let C = (ε 0 , δ 0 ), (t 1 , t 2 , . . . be a confined chain with constant length.
Instead of analyzing the chain C, it will be more convenient below to analyze an "equivalent chain" C for which δ i ≤ ε i for all i. We get C from C as follows: we go over the transformations one at a time, starting from the first transformation, and maintain the invariant that we always have δ i ≤ ε i . If after the next transformation we still have δ i+1 ≤ ε i+1 then we leave that transformation unchanged. On the other hand, if after the next transformation (of type R with parameter t i ) we have δ i+1 ≥ ε i+1 then we break it into two transformation: a type R transformation with parameter t i that increases δ and decreases until they are exactly equal (t i could be fractional), and a type S transformation with parameter t i = t i /t i . In some more detail, instead of computing ε i+1 = ε t i i and δ i+1 = 1 − (1 − δ i ) t i , we do the following:
• We compute the real number t i < t i such that ε
• We invert the type of all the transformations until the end of the chain.
Formally, what we do is to remove t i from the chain and replace it with t i , t i (so we get a chain which is one longer than the original one).
It is clear that the change from above only switches the roles of ε and δ (i.e., we have ε i+1 = δ i+1 and δ i+1 = ε i+1 , and similarly for i + 2, i + 3, . . .). It should also be noted that the resulting chain does not correspond to transformations that can be applied to the commitment scheme (since we use fractional values for the t i 's), but all the values of ε i , δ i are still well defined, and their sum is equal to what it was in C. Finally, the length of C is at most twice the length of the original C, so C still has constant length.
From now on, we therefore assume that we have a constant-length confined chain C that starts from δ 0 ≤ ε 0 and maintains δ i ≤ ε i , for all i. Denote the number of transformations in C by and assume, without loss of generality, that is even (since we can always append a last dummy transformation with t = 1).
Again, we consider the quantity
, and the condition
. We show that the quantity a i − 1 grows by at most a factor of O(log k) in every two successive transformations in the chain. It follows that a
, which in particular means that ε + δ ≥ 1 − o(1) > 1/2. In more details, we prove by induction that, for every even i, we have a i − 1 ≤ (8c log k) i/2 · (a 0 − 1), where the constant c is the one from the "confinement" property of the chain C (namely all the ε i 's and δ i 's are bounded by 1 − k −c ).
This holds for i = 0 by definition, and we now proceed to the induction step. Assume that for some even i < it holds that 1−a i ≤ (1−a 0 )·(8c log k) i/2 . This in particular means that ε i +δ i ≥ 1−o(1), and therefore (since we have (1) . We now examine how the quantity 1−ε δ evolves over the next two steps.
• The next (odd-numbered) transformation is of type S, so we have δ i+1 = δ
, and since the sequence is confined then 1 − ε i+1 ≤ k −c . Thus we have
so it follows that t i+1 < 2c log k < 1/2(a i − 1) (since 1/(a i − 1) = ω(polylog(k)). This means that we have , so we have b i+1 − 1 = (a i+1 − 1)δ i+1 /ε i+1 .
• The next (even-numbered) transformation is of type R, so we have δ i+2 = 1 − (1 − δ i+1 ) t i+2 and ε i+2 = (ε i+1 ) t i+2 . Recall that we have δ i+2 ≤ ε i+2 and therefore δ i+2 < 1/2 < 1 − e −1 , so (1 − δ i+1 ) t i+2 = 1 − δ i+2 > e −1 , which means that t i+2 < 1/δ i+1 . Recall also that we have ε i+1 ≥ ε i ≥ 1/2 − o(1), and therefore
so t i+2 < 1/δ i+1 < 1/2(b i+1 − 1). Thus we have
Hence
In addition, since δ i+1 < 1/2 and 1 ≤ t i+2 < 1/δ i+1 then from Fact 3 above we get that
and we also know that ε i+2 ≤ ε i+1 . Thus, we have
This concludes the proof of the only if direction. 2
• In the second step, one uses the existence of a hard-core set as above to prove hardness amplification, roughly arguing that if we choose x 1 , . . . , x n at random, then at least one of them will be in the hard-core set S (except with probability δ n ) and therefore no efficient algorithm will be able to invert all of the values y i = f (x i ) except with probability close to δ n . (Converting this "intuitive argument" to an actual reduction is quite straightforward.)
Consider now applying this argument to hardness of interactive protocols: Let (A, B) be a protocol (where we assume for simplicity that the parties do not have any inputs), and consider for example the task of recovering the randomness of B from the interaction. First notice that in the honestbut-curious attack model we can still use the argument from above: Consider the function that takes as input x = (r a , r b ) and outputs both r a and the transcript:
f (r a , r b ) = (r a , A(r a ), B(r b ) ).
The output of this function captures exactly the view of an honet-but-curious adversary that interacts with B, and hence we can apply the results about hardness amplification for the case of non-interactive functions also to this case.
However, this line of argument does not seem to extend to the malicious attack model. In this case the transcript of the protocol is not an input which is generated by a fixed known procedure, but it actually depends on the actions of the adversary. For every fixed cheating adversary A * we can still define the function f A * (r a , r b ) = (r a , A * (r a ), B(r b ) ) that captures the view of A * when interacting with B, but it is no longer the same function for all A * 's. Trying to apply the line of arguments from above, we thus cannot get an analog of the first step: We can no longer "ask many different algorithms" about the transcript, since these "algorithms" are now interactive adversaries that expect to actively participate in the creation of that transcript. We can choose one of these "many different algorithms" and use it to generate the transcript, but we have only one chance to do so. If this turns out to be the wrong algorithm then we cannot go back and try a different one, since B cannot be rewound to run the protocol again.
